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Ac~counting t-o the Workforce 
Judy Brown* 
In New Zealand the disclosure of accounting information to employees and/or trade 
unions is comparative,ly rare and is not required by law or encouraged by Government. 
Although there has be,en little debate, the~e is evidence of developing interest. This paper 
examines the rationales for and objections to labour-oriented disclosures. 
Introduction 
In recent years there have been signs of developing interest in N~ew Zealand in the 
disclosure of accounting info1n1ation to employees and unions. A number of companies have 
continued the practice, initiated during the 1970s, of providing specialised annual reports to 
employees (Smith, 1985). Several workplaces are now ~covered by joint union/management 
• 
consultative agreements and most of these contain infoxrnation sharing clauses. Submissions 
to the Committee of Inquiry into Industrial Democracy by the Employers' Federation, (NZEF, 
1989) Business Roundtable (NZBR, 1989) and Council of Trade Unions (NZCTU, 1989) all 
contained specific ~eferences to the concept of inforrraation disclosure. Further interest is also 
likely to be stimulated by ,current moves towalids enterprise bargaining. 
Rational~es for greater disclosure 
People of various political persuasions and both employers and unions have supported 
the idea of 'accounting to the workforce'. However, they frequently do so for very different 
~easons. The differences become apparent when comparisons are made of management and 
employee perspectives on disclosure. 
Management-espoused ~ationales 
Management-espoused rationales tend to reflect a unitary frame of reference, which 
is based upon a notion of fully shared interests. 'The enterprise is viewed as a functionally 
integrated and inherently harmonious system, analogous to a team. Managers, as the 'team 
captains', guide the organisation towards the attainment of p~ofitability and efficiency goals 
which serve the rational purpose of all. This belief in common objectives and 'positive sum' 
relationships leads to a denial of organisational conflict, with adversarial attitudes being 
attributed to misunderstanding, stupidity or the work of 'agitators' (Fox, 1973).. 
Within this perspective, communication is viewed as a means of encouraging more 
responsible, co-operative and pfoductive industrial attitudes. The ~expectation is that the 
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provision of certain financial infot ruation will promote understanding of and identification 
with the disclosing company and thereby have a favourable impact on enterprise productivity 
and efficiency. Industrial relations may thus be conducted in a more 'rational and 
harmonious' way. The emphasis is strongly utilitarian, with no explicit ~ecognition that 
employees or their representatives have rights to infoimation. The strong prefefence is for 
disclosure to be left on a purely voluntary basis i.e. a matter of managerial prerogative . 
. Management initiatives in this area are not new. In the United Kingdom and the 
United States, the practice of 'employee feporting' has been traced back to the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth oentury. Most of this early development was in relation to the 
operation of pfofit-sharing and co-partnership schemes and the emergence of trade unions 
(Hussey, 1981; Bougen, 1988). Authors from the 1920s, for example, promoted the use of 
staff house journals as a way of offsetting "the lost healthy intimacy of 'shirt sleeve' days of 
workman and boss" and as "a panacea to sweep a way disloyalty, unrest, inefficiency and 
strikes" (Lewis, Parker and Sutcliffe 1984.: 230). 
During World War 2 there was a further surge of interest in connection with the 
establishment of workplace consultative committees to advise on productivity and efficiency. 
Around this time, attention was also being paid to the theories of the 'human relations' school 
of social psychology, which had its origins in the work of Mayo (1933). Human relations 
theorists placed great store upon 'employ~ee communication schemes', claiming they would 
lead to greater harmony in the workplace and tangible rewards in company perfoitnance. 
Burchell, Clubb and .Hopwood (1981: 96-97) report that readers of United Kingdom 
management journals during the 1940s and early 1950s were greeted by headlines such as 
"Telling workers the facts"; "Scottish fum tells the workers 'What and Why"' and "Workers 
had all the facts - up went efficiency". In the United States, employers were advised that 
employee reports could reach "to the very heart of some of the most serious labour problems" 
(Barloon, 1941: 124) and lead to "fewer strikes and other evidences of dislocations in the 
relations between management and employees" (Powlison, 1947: 145). 
During the 1970s employer organisations in the United Kingdom, Australia and New 
Zealand actively promoted financial disclosures to employees as a central component of 
'economic education' and 'employee involvement' progtammes (Confederation of British 
Industry 1975, 1976, 1977; Enterprise Australia, 1978; NZ Chambers of Commerce 1977, 
1980; NZEF 1980). The NZ Chambers of Commerce (1980) described its work in this area 
as part of an overall programme "designed to in1prove public understanding of business and 
to promote support for the competitive market concept". The NZEF (1980:18) emphasised 
the link between financial infot marion and company identification, claiming that it 
"encourages employees to feel they belong, particularly if the company is successful and 
expanding .... 
Employers were warned that if they were not prepared to take the initiative in the area 
of employee ,communication "they ·may eventually be confronted with externally imposed 
statutory provisions which could seriously hinder the development and viability of private 
enterprise" (Confederntion of Australian Industry, cit,ed in Craig and Hussey 1982: 7). 
In the event, voluntary disclosure initiatives did not prove completely successful in 
staving off the 'threat' of legislation. While the provision of financial infotmation direct to 
employees remains a largely voluntary practice, labour representatives in the United Stat~s 
and United Kingdom have been granted rights of access to information for collective 
bargaining purposes. .More recently, United Kingdom employers have also come under the 
influence of the European Community Disclosure Directives. Unions in New Zealand and 
Australia, however, have had little success in this area to date. 
' 
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When the issue of disclosure resurfaced recently in New Zealand in the context of the 
Labour Government sponsored inquiry into Industrial Democracy, the NZEF (1989: 2) again 
stressed the importance of communication in intrcxlucing "more effective co-operation and 
consultation" with the object of improving '•'efficiency, productivity, profits and the quality 
of life for everyone".. In particular, the principles of "good communication and a sharing of 
infotn1ation" were seen as having an important role to play in creating "mutual trust" between 
managements and employees. The Federation preferred not to involve unions in any such 
communications exercise on the gfounds that their interests "would generally require that they 
advocate the disbursement of profits into wages or conditions or other fot1ns of expenditure 
rather than into capital formation" (NZEF, 1989: 17) .. 
Employ,ee-espoused rationales 
Whereas employer rationales conoenttate on the pfospects for unity and inc1eased 
prcxluctivity, labour-oriented arguments tend to emphasise the social and moral responsibilities 
of management. Disclosure is not viewed simply as a route to increased productivity and 
efficiency. Employees ~e seen as having a right to be infotxned and consulted about the state 
and pfospects of the organisations in which they work, regardless of the possibl~e economic 
benefits to the organisation. Mandatory disclosure is supported on the grounds that, in order 
to be effective, the "moml right ... almost certainly needs converting into a legal right" (Owen 
and Harte, 1984= 184). 
Employee-espoused rationales are based on a pluralistic world-view. Fiinas are view~ed 
as coalitions of participants with diverse and at times conflicting interests and aspirations. 
Labour-management relationships encompass mixed motives; parties are simultaneously 
confronted with incentives to ~co-operate and incentives to compet~e. This makes the whole 
question of managerial governance problematic; the 'captains' of industry cannot necessarily 
be relied upon to look after the in~erests of all organisational participants. Conflict is based 
on genuinely different inteliests. It is inevitable but may be managed. The end result reflects 
some kind of 'negotiated order' . 
Pluralists agree that concepts of in£ormation-sharing are fundamental to a more truly 
co-operative approach in the workplace and that the impact on productivity can be positive. 
However, infotmation cannot eliminate the gaps between the priorities of management and 
those of the workforce. The real value of accounting infouoati.on lies in its potential for 
managing the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise between capital and labour. Within 
such a framework, disclosure may, for example, be used to strengthen management 
accountability and to support industrial democracy and collective bargaining initiatives. 
(a) accountability 
The practice of preparing audited financial statements developed in an attempt to 
secure the accountability of managers to the providers of equity capital (Littleton, 1958). 
Indeed, accountability has been described as the 'backbone' of accounting (Ijiri, 1975). More 
recently there hav,e been calls for recognition that employees have interests in the functioning 
of organisations at least as imponant as those of shareholders. Maunders (1981: 2), for 
example, obseiVes that "both groups are dependent upon the organisation for earnings and 
both may be considered to have 'capital' tied up in the organisation". 
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Accountability is even more important given that employees, unlike shareholders, have 
little opportunity to diversify the risks associated with their investment relationship: 
Employees not only derive their income from enterprises which employ them, but they 
devote a large proportion of their daily lives to the enterprise. Decisions taken by or in the 
enterprise can have a substantial effect on their economic circumstances, both immediately 
and in the longer term; the satisfaction which ·they derive from work; their health and 
physical condition; the time and energy which they can devote to their families and to 
activities other than work; and even their sense of dignity and autonomy as human beings 
(Moore, 1979: 42-43). 
It has been suggested that employee intel'ests could be served through the inclusion 
of more substantive labour-related infotrnation in corporate reports, for example, infottnation 
on such matters as the range of incomes, superannuation contributions, maintenance of 
employee purchasing power, transfer pricing policies, levels and locations of employment, 
equal employment opportunities, skills ·training, health and safety records, and so on. Such 
disclosures, by providing greater visibility to particular issues, may influence management 
behaviour. Medawar (1978: 473) observes: 
Power corrupts less when accounted for- because if decision-makers know they may be 
called upon to explain and justify the use of lheir powers, they are far :mo~e likely to make 
more considered and equitable decisions than they otherwise might 
The Accounting Standard Steering Committee (1975) makes a similar observation. 
(b) Support of industrial democracy initiatives 
Recognition of the extent to which employees are affected by decisions made in 
organisations has led not only to calls for more accountability but also for more worker 
participation in those decisions. Access to infotxnation is seen as a necessary prerequisite to 
infotrned and constructive participation, as "no realistic input can occur in the absence of 
knowledge" (NZCfU, 1989: 17). 
Whereas accountability concerns may be satisfied through the external reporting 
function, effective worker participation inevitably requires access to internal management 
accounting data. If there is to be a genuine sharing of decision-making, employees need 
sufficient infonnation to enable them to make their own, independent assessments. 
Infoitnation must be provided in a relatively 'raw' state and on a timely basis to allow for 
both the evaluation of management pfoposals and, where necessary, the development of 
alternative plans. Published "glossy" annual repons cannot hope to serve as an adequate 
pfoxy. 
Indeed it seems probable that management infotmation systems would currently be 
ill-prepared to setvice the requirements of industrial democracy schemes. Management poses 
questions and makes decisions within a particular framework and infotanation is gathered and 
processed accordingly. Labour representatives are likely to take account of broader 
considerations. In the case of invesnnent strategies, for instance, wage, job security and 
health and safety implications are likely to be accorded a higher priority by unions than 
management. Unions may have to look at negotiating the types of info1mation collected or, 
perhaps, establish infoiination systems of their own. 
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(c) Collectiv,e bargaining 
It has been claimed that inforrnation sharing is essential to the proper conduct of 
coll~ective bargaining. The issue is largely one of procedural justice. Union leaders in 
Canada, for example, have complained that in most bargaining situations "They don't know 
what the real financial status of the employer is, nor do they know which (if any) of the 
conflicting figures published on profits and productivity are accurate" (Jain, 1981: 749). A 
United Kingdom Commission on Industrial Relations (1972: 21) stated: 
Collective bargaining cannot take place at all without some infonnation as a basis for the 
ex,changes between the parties so there is no question that infonnation is a necessary 
element in the whole process. The ,question at issue is not whether infonnation in itself 
should play a role but whether each side should rely on its own resources. Employers often 
have access to more infonnation than unions. 
Access to accounting information in New Zealand is likely to become increasingly 
important in view of current trends towards enterprise and productivity bargaining. If this 
takes place in 'the absence of systematic disclosure the workforce may be inclined "'to beli~eve 
that they have got the worst of the deal" (Corinna and Reeves, 1981: 24). 
Foley and Maunders (1977, 1984) suggest that, in discussing collective bargaining 
issues, the distinction between integrative 'win-win' environments and distributive 'win-lose' 
environments is useful. In integrative bargaining a 'problem-solving' approach can be taken. 
The more relevant infoiination the parties share, the better the problem-solving approach is 
likely to function, for example through more adequate problem definition, generation of more 
ideas and improved evaluation of those ideas. 
In distributive bargaining decision-making is more political. Infotmation becomes a 
power resource for use in what is an essentially competitiv,e situation. It may be used to 
"confuse, mystify or convince"' (Cooper, 1984: 128) in an attempt to influence the outcome 
in one's own favour. For ~example, warnings by a company of low profitability may alter 
union perceptions of the consequences of pressing a pay demand. Management may or may 
not be trying to revise union perceptions in the direction of 'truth' (although opportunities for 
opportunistic behaviour are limited by the requirement that infonnation be credible to the 
union). 
Foley and Maunders suggest that these differing bargaining contexts go some way to 
explaining why managements may be reluctant to ~open the books'. More liberal disclosure 
policies may benefit management in integrative bargaining situations. But they may lose a 
tactical weapon in distributive bargaining situations. The difficulty is that integrative 
processes almost always involve a distributive phase (Walton & Mc~ersie, 1965),. 
Foley and Maunders also discuss the potential for disclosure to act as an 'attitudinal 
structuring' tool, facilitating shifts towards molie co-operative relationships and thereby 
increasing the possibility of 'good integrative payoffs'. They conclude that no generalisation 
can be made about the likely impact of disclosure on bargaining outcomes. Management's 
policy choice is likened to an investment decision with positive or negative cash flows in the 
short-texm from distributive bargaining (depending on the content of infotmation in relation 
to prior expectations) and possible positive cash flows in the longer-tenn (via the effects on 
integrative bargaining and attitudinal structuring). The more important issue, perhaps, is 
whether disclosure is properly a matter of management policy or a question of public policy. 
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Objections to increased disclosure 
There has been resistance to the idea of increased c.lisclosure of accounting matters 
from both employers and unions. Again, the bases of their respective concerns are quite 
different. 
Employers' resistance 
Employer objections are fairly predictable and surface most oft~en in the context of 
calls for mandatory disclosure. They centre around four main themes: the concept of 
managerial p~erogati ve, the inability of employees and/or unions to understand infot n1ation, 
the danger that labour fecipients will 'misinterpret' infottnation and confidentiality constraints. 
(a) The concept of .managerial p~erogative 
Company managements in general refuse to concede the principle of accountability 
to labour or the need for 'democratic' influences in the workplace. They fear that increased 
disclosure of infottnation will ~enhance employee power and lead to a loss of control in areas 
which should remain the exclusive prerogative of management. 
The Trade Union Congress, prior to the enactment of discloswe provisions in the 
United Kingdom Employment Protection Act 1975, observed that "the control of infottnation 
about a company's activities has been a basic aspect of the managerial prerogative that has 
proved extraordinarily difficult t.o break down" (TUC, 1974). 
Justifications for the ~concept of managerial prefogative centre around three main 
themes: the rights attached to property ownership, company law which endorses an 
over-riding responsibility to shareholders and various 'economic efficiency' arguments: 
Management as owners or agents of owners must have control over their capital 
assets. ('The right to do what one likes with one's own.') As labour owns no part of these 
assets, the way in which they shall be utilised is solely a matter ~or the owners and their 
representatives (Storey, 1983: 103). 
It is difficult for boards of directors to have direct responsibilities to various 
different bodies. In any conflict of interest there must be one over-riding responsibility. 
Company law has identified this responsibility as being to lhe shareholders whose money 
is invested in the company (Knight, 1979: 25). 
It is in everyone's interests: consumers, shareholders, the nation, and workers alike, 
that managers be left alone to manage as they see fit. Management"s way is the more 
~efficient (Storey, 1983: 104 ). 
(b) Inability of employe,es or unions to understand information 
Research studies hav~e found that employees and union representatives lack expertise 
in financial accounting (Lyall, 1975; Mitchell, Sams and White, 1981; Craig and Hussey, 
1981). This lack of sophistication is frequently used to defend non-disclosure. The problem 
does not seem insut1nountable. The point has been made, for example, that concerns about 
financial literacy have not hindered statutory disclosure to shafeholders (Corinna and Reeves, 
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1981 ). Obviously a basic understanding of concepts would develop if accounting data became 
a matter for regular disclosure and negotiation. However, it is agreed that this is insufficient 
on its own. In its submissions to the Committee on Industrial Democracy, the Council of 
Trade Unions stressed the importance of access to education in preparing employees 'to play 
,a more participative role in the workplace. The problem of technical proficiency might also 
be alleviated by giving unions the right to call in financial advisors to obtain, interpret and 
analyse infotmation and/or perfo1m labour audits. A major difficulty with this is that the 
capabilities of accountants in the area of labour consultancy are likely to be limited by their 
own lack of industrial relations training. Thus, in addition to the notion of promoting 
accounting expertise within the labour movement, some thought might also have to be given 
to the inclusion of industrial relations programmes in accounting education. 
(c) Misint,erp~etation of information 
Company managements also fear that a lack of technical competence will lead labour 
recipients to 'misinterpret' infounation (Dickens, 1980), although the point has been made 
that what management views as misinterpretation may simply be a refusal to draw the same 
conclusions. Reeves (1980: 3) observes that management's instinct is to see its "interpretation 
of the facts as the only one that right-thinking people could reach"'. However interpretation 
of facts may differ in good faith when people have different philosophies and different values. 
Each side may look equally 'irrational' to the other. The Council of 'Trade Unions 
emphasised "the right to present alternative viewpoints (to management's)" as a further base 
requirement of industrial democracy (NZCfU, 1989: 17). 
This issue is particularly important with respect to the provision of financial 
inforn1ation because, contra.ty to popular opinion, there are few 'facts' in accounting. Popular 
notions of 'truth' as co!"fespondence with an 'objective reality' are difficult to apply to 
accounting statements. Many accounting concepts - ~e.g., profit, fmancial position, 
depreciation etc. - have no independent existence. They represent absttact ideas resulting 
from the accounting process itself rather than neutral 'facts' capable of being verified through 
observation. Accountants can record fmancial transactions in a variety of ways without 
necessarily stepping outside accepted accounting pmctice. Different methods will lead to 
different profit figures, asset values, rates of return etc. This flexibility means that figures 
can be deliberately adjusted to give a particular financial result. Education is important to 
ensure that employees and their representatives are not easy targets for the various foxn1s of 
'creative' accounting. 
A growing number of accounting researchers and practitioners are also beginning to 
acknowledge the limitations of conventional accounting practice. ~Cooper and Sherer (1984), 
for example, draw atlention to its narrow, private basis and 'pronounced shareholder 
orientation'. They observ~e that such a system cannot necessarily be relied upon ro lead to 
resource allocation decisions that are 'optimal' or 'rational' for employees or soci~ety as a 
whole. Conceptions of 'profit' and 'efficiency., change if one moves from a ~capital to a 
labour perspective or from a private to a community perspective. Again, contrary to public 
opinion, it is possible to 'argue with the figures'. Faced with accounting-backed ~guments 
for redundancies, plant closmes, wage restraints, etc. it may be possible to develop alternative 
accountings that lead to quite different conclusions. 
In this context, it is important to realise that the critical issues concerning what matters 
should be accounted for and how they should be accounted for are not technical; they are 
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political (Cooper and Sherer, 1984). 
The idea of accounting infotmation as a neutral arbiter in industrial relations disputes 
becomes less tenable in this light. Accounting infot tnation is never neutral. It is not simply 
something that exists 'out there' to be collated by people without inte~ests and aspirations. 
As Cooper (1984: 128) observes "Values are implicit in the decision to produce information 
on one issue rather than another, to measure benefits or costs from one perspective rnther than 
an alternative." However disclosure could be used to supply "a cottective to any limitations 
in management's perspective .. (Reeves, 1980: 18) and to facilitate 'conversation' or 'dialogue' 
between the parties (Morgan, 1988). Within a pluralistic perspective, it might thus be seen 
to contribute to a more fairly negotiated onier. 
(d) Confidentiality 
Objections are frequently backed by claims that disclosure would endanger the 
competitive position of the organisation. The NZBR, in its submissions to the Committee of 
Inquiry into Industrial Democracy, stressed the importance of confidentiality of infotmation 
to protect incentives for innovation: 
Compelling information-sharing for the sake of information-sharing is likely to impose 
significant costs in ~cases where it does not contribute significantly to - or indeed threatens 
- the effective functioning of the company (NZBR, 1989: 12). 
Similarly United Kingdom employers, when faced with calls for increased disclosure, 
argued that the kinds of information disclosed to employees should be strictly limited by 
'" ( c )onstraints arising out of competitive liequirements and confidentiality ... " (Confederation 
of British Industry, 1975). 
A number of writers contend that managements seeking to defend non-disclosure have 
placed undue emphasis on confidentiality constraints, and the 1972 United Kingdom 
Commission on Industrial Relations noted that, "We met ·Cases where employers viewed with 
dismay the idea of giving to unions infotmation which was, in fact, freely available in the 
company's annual report"' (Commission on Industrial Relations, 1972: 93). Moo~e (1979) 
draws attention to evidence from European countries where management's fears about more 
participative practices have proved largely groundless and notes that unions often receive 
sensitive infot n1ation in the cont~ext of their existing dealings with companies. He also points 
to the extent of knowledge already existing about competitors and the insignificance of union 
representatives as offenders with respect to insider trading as opposed to directors, major 
shareholders and senior employees . 
. unions' resistance 
Resistance to increased disclosure on the part of management is perhaps not surprising. 
More interestingly, there has also been some resistance to the idea from within the union 
mov~ement. This so-called 'ostrich approach' towards infotination disclosure "is characterised 
by a lack of inte~est in company infotmation, or ·cynicism about its value, or even strong 
hostility towards securing and discussing company information (Gospel, 1978: 20). 
Unionists and labour commentators with reservations about the value of greater 
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'infoiination sharing' have expressed four major f':dl"S: that employees run the risk of being 
drawn into supporting managerial aims/rationality, that disclos~e could lead to a fo11n of 
pseudo-participation, scepticism about the credibility and impartiality of management's facts 
and figures and doubts about the accounting p!iofession's commitment to 'truth and fairness'. 
(a) Risk of incorporation of workers into 1nanagerial aims/rationality 
Some unionists fear that in pursuing company info1n1ation, unions will become 
socialised into endorsing managerial objectives and rationality, and that as a consequence 
capital interests will be the major beneficiaries of increased disclosure: 
Fancy ~onnulae for calculating bonuses or ihe 'sharing' of 'added value'. combined with the 
selective doling out of misinformation. add to the possibility of confusion amongst workers, 
and to the danger that some shop stewards may find themselves cosily incorporated into 
management's ~ethos and 'mysteries' (Coates and Topham, 1974: 109). 
In essence, there is wariness about becoming involved in a discourse overwhelmed by 
the 'assumptions of capitalism' and over which labour interests have traditionally had little 
influence. Alternative accountings are given little chance of gaining legitimacy. 
(b) Pse.udo-participation 
A number of writers (Dickens., 1980; Moore, 1979) have emphasised the importance 
of viewing disclosure issues in the context of trade union functions. Dickens suggests that 
infottnation is of little value in the absence of concessions to workplace democracy. She 
observ~es, for example, that there appears "to be little point in pushing for disclosure of 
prospective infonuation if planning remains a management prerogative" (1980: 25). Increased 
disclosure may be a necessacy condition for 'real' participation, but it is not a sufficient one. 
Cooper (1984: 128) goes further and warns that disclosure can lead to a fo1m of 'pseudo' 
participation, which serves to strengthen management's position: 
Instead of investing in an array of direct controls (e .. g. supervision and incentive schemes) 
over labour., managers may prefer to use infonnation to ~c11eate a sense of responsibility and 
integrate labour into the organisation. This is the approach which is frequently implicit in 
management's suggestions for information disclosure; it leaves managers with the control 
over business policy and investment and offers labour the appearance of participation and 
a shared (but false) sense of responsibility. 
Whilst disclosure itself does not guarantee employee influence over organisational 
decision-making, it may increase pressures for refotm. Some unionists are adamant that any 
offers of information should be taken up .. since appetite grows with the eating" (Coates and 
Topham, 1974: 110). According to this view, disclosure can activate objectives and lead to 
the identification of new industrial relations issues by changing perceptions of such matters 
as pay discrepancies, job security prospects, managerial efficiency, etc. 
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(c) Scepticism about management's facts and figures 
Some writers have observed that the flexibility inherent in current accounting practice 
and the received view of accounting as a technical, objective and neutral discipline promoting 
'rational decision-making' are highly functional for managers. Knights and Collinson (1987), 
for example, comment on the fatalistic acceptance by workers of accounting infotmation to 
justify redundancies and plant closures. They attribute this lack of resistance to perceptions 
of figures as objective and factual. Gospel (1978: 25) observes that where there are large 
differences in expert power between management and unions, "an increase in infotnlation 
disclosure may provide the more powerful with the means of exercising their expertise" and 
therefore increasing power differences in the workplace. In~otmation may be 'pre-processed' 
to support particular alternatives. In this context, it is interesting to observe O'Leary's (1985: 
90) suggestion that accountants owe a duty to those whose welfares are affected by 
accounting to make them mo~e aware of the "inadequacies and areas of doubt" in accounting 
so they are .. better able to defend themselves": 
In a Swedish survey which looked at union influence on accounting practic~es, one 
respondent remarked that union representatives "exhibited a curious ~combination of 
confidence and mistrust in accounting" (Jonsson, 1988: 149).. There was a basic conception 
of accounting being capable of producing a 'true' image but at the same time companies were 
suspected of manipulating the infotmation for their own purposes. In this context there have 
been complaints in the United Kingdom about the lack of opportunity for unions to verify 
infotmation e.g. no access to original documents (Dickens, 1980). 
Other writers have observed that some options may never be considered because of 
the value judgements underpinning the structure and content of accounting infotmation 
systems . . As Arrow (1974: 49) observes "if it is decided to collect no information relating to 
a certain class of decisions, these decisions are non-agenda". Union trustees of pension funds 
in the United Kingdom, for example, have complained that they are unable to obtain financial 
infozrnation which does not rely on 'City' assumptions about what Iiepresents a good 
investment (Owen and Lloyd, 1985). 
(d) Doubts about the accounting profession's commitment to (truth and fairness' 
There are also perceptions of the accountant as a tool of management. Difficulties 
relating to the perceived independence of auditors in the context of the managemen't/share-
holder relationship are well documented (Mautz and Hussein, 1961; Sherer and Kent, 1983; 
Montagna, 1986).. And, as Fol~ey and Maunders (1977) observ~e, this is probably a far more 
sympathetic relationsltip than the management/employee one. 
The accounting profession has at times supported the idea of increased disclosure to 
labour. The Corporate Report, a widely-publicised United Kingdom discussion document on 
financial reporting, gave strong backing to the idea that employees have 'rights' to 
infot xx1ation: 
Nothing illustrates more vividly the nineteenth century origin of British company law than 
the way in which employees are almost totally ignored in the present Companies Acts and 
in corporate reports. The 1967 Companies Act introduced a requirement for companies with 
.mofe than 100 ~employees to state in the directors' report the average number of employees 
per week and the aggregate remuneration paid This modest :requirement barely does justice 
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to the role of companies as the life support systems for millions of people (Accounting 
Standards Steering Committee, 1975: 51). 
The relevance of an employee perspective for the dev,elopment of accounting policy has also 
been acknowledged with the appointment of labour representatives on some overseas standa.fd 
setting bodies. 
However, it is probably fair to say that the views of the profession hav,e more 
generally been closest to those of management. Disclosure has tended to be seen in tetms 
of 'good' communications, with emphasis on the identity of inrerests between management 
and labour,. the practical problems associated with 'mandatory' 11eporting and the need to 
preserve commeocial confidentiality (Institute of Chattered Accountants in England and Wales, 
1974; Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies 1975, 1976; Hundred Group 1976). 
Jonsson (1988), in his survey of Swedish accounting policymaking, found that other 
members of the standard setting body had difficulty in understanding what union 
representatives meant. Union representatives w~ere also seen as using a political basis for their 
argumentation. This hardly seems surprising if one accepts the point made earlier that 
differences in values and perspectives will lead to difierent conclusions about how things 
should be accounted for. And perhaps it is not until there is a clash of 'world views' that the 
inherently political nature of many accounting issues becomes apparent. ~Owen and Harte 
(1984) suggest that accountants are likely to be reluctant to support the concept of increased 
disclosure while company management generally refuses to concede the principle of employee 
accountability. 'This raises some fundamental questions £or the pro~ession about just whose 
interests accountants are or should be protecting. 
Marques (1976: 178) posed the question: "Are people a resource for the enterprise or 
is the ~enterprise a resource for people?" Current accounting theory and practice would 
certainly appear to favour the fot .mer view. Accounting is based on a primarily proprietary 
model of the fnm, with mov,es towards a 'self-entity' concept. The organisation is vi~ew~ed 
as an instrument for maximising shareholders' wealth or, according to the self-entity theory, 
as existing for its own purposes. Either way, labour simply becomes a cost to be minimised. 
Disclosures ~e primarily oriented to the capital mark!ets. Attention is focused on private 
efficiency rather than on social efficiency. However, ,as indicated earlier, there are signs of 
change_ In this context, it seems appropriate that accountants and others be warned not to 
attribute to current accounting ~concepts and classifications "a facticity and an immutability 
to which they are not entitled .. (O'Leary, 1985: 89),. 
The 'ostrich' approach to disclosure reflects a radical perspective in tei ms of Fox's 
(1973) framework. The radical view is essentially a critique of the pluralist perspectiv~e. 
Radicals claim that the pluralist view implies a degree of equality between stakeholder parties 
which simply does not exist. It assumes. for example, that grievances are recognised and 
acted upon and that decision-making arenas are open to any organised group. Radicals stress 
that agendas may be controlled and that potential issues may be kept out through the forces 
of socialisation so that anyone challenging the status quo will be labelled a ' ·trouble ma~er'. 
For radicals, capital can never be 'just another inrerest ,group'. 
Disclosure, according to the radical view, is simply an ex,ercise in indoctrination; a 
managerial strategy for obtaining co-operation and securing compliance from employees £or 
managerial values and objectives (Ogden and Bougen, 1985). Manag,ement uses accounting 
infotntation to implement its preferences by creating partial and one-sided views of reality and 
by shaping decision-making in accordance with capital-oriented values and perspectives. This 
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lends a kind of selective visibility to the world which plays an important role in influencing 
what people see as problematic, possible, desirable and significant. Because labour interests 
cannot hope to enter the discourse on more or less equal tetans, unions are well advised to 
eschew the world of accountancy and concentrate on more traditional methods of protecting 
employee interests. 
Conclusion 
Trade unions and employers have widely differing expectations of the need for and 
consequences of greater disclosure of accounting infotmation. Managerial perspectives on 
disclosure tend to be unitarist in nature. Communication, when supported, is valued in tetrns 
of its potential for removing misunderstandings, encouraging a sense of responsibility in the 
workforce, eliminating 'us and them' attitudes, cultivating employee identification with the 
organisation and motivating employees on to the achievement of common goals. Accounting 
is thus considered to have the capacity to contribute to improved productivity and more 
rational and harmonious industrial relations. Suggestions of an enforceable 'right' to 
infotmation are generally viewed as contrary to the 'proper pwposes' of communication. 
Disclosure issues are considered to be rightfully a matter of managerial prerogative. 
Employee-espoused rationales tend to reflect a pluralistic frame of reference. 
Disclosure, backed by legal prescription, provides a basis for managing the conflicts of 
interest that inevitably arise between capital and labour. It may be used, for example, to 
strengthen management accountability, to support industrial democracy initiatives and for 
collective bargaining pwposes. Any notion of accounting infotnaation as an apolitical and 
neutral arbiter becomes less tenable in this light. People with different values and interests 
will want to 'account' for things differently. Alternative accountings consistent with labour 
interests and aspirations are required to facilitate 'dialogue' between the parties and thereby 
facilitate a more fairly negotiated order. 
According to the radical perspective, disclosure can best be understood in te1ans of the 
hegemonic domination of capital. lnfotanation sharing is nerely a managerial strategy for 
inducing co-operation and securing compliance from employees for managerial values and 
objectives. Management uses accounting infouuation to lend a kind of selective visibility to 
the world. The result is the creation of partial and one-sided views of reality which reinforce 
the shaping of decision-making in accordance with capital-miented perspectives. Radicals 
doubt the chances of 'alternative accountings' acquiring legitimacy and believe that, given 
present conditions, it is improbable that accounting could serve simultaneously the interests 
of employers and employees. 
In drawing attention to these various perspectives, it is hoped that this paper will 
stimulate further discussion on the issues. The author also hopes that any preconceived 
notions readers may have had about accounting being a 'boring technical activity' devoid of 
political significance have been well and truly dispelled. Any remaining sceptics may wish 
to ponder the following extract from Tinker (1985: xv-xvi): 
The systematic understatement of accounting's significance is reflected in tbe images of 
accoWltants in popnlarculture: u the technician, the innocuou bookkeeper, tbe •ink-stained 
wretch,' the reoord-keeptZ whose lack of acativity makes him trustwordty .... (Accountants 
may be seen) not as barmlen bookktq)Cis, but as arbiters in social conftict. as IICbitects 
of unequal exchanges, as instruments of alienation, and as accomplices in the expropriadon 
of life expea ieocea of otben. 
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